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# BALLOT STRUCTURE, CANDIDATE RACE, AND VOTE CHOICE IN BRAZIL

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*Abstract: Although racial injustice and inequality are widely acknowledged in Brazil, recent experimental research concludes that citizens there do not rely on racial cues when voting. In this article, we test for the impact of candidate race on vote choice. We find evidence of identity-based voting in Brazil that interacts with ballot size. When facing a short ballot with only a few candidates, most subjects chose candidates without regard to race or color. But when presented with a large ballot with many candidates, white and brown subjects show a significant preference for same-race candidates. Self-identified black subjects, however, demonstrated a strong and consistent preference for black candidates regardless of choice set size. These results are particularly important given Brazil's electoral rules that provide voters with overwhelming numbers of candidates from which to choose.*

Brazil has a long and complex history of race. Patterns of slavery, immigration, and years of intermarriage have created a diverse society, but one without the strong racial identities and politics found elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Political and intellectual elites crafted Brazil's national identity based on the existence of one group, the product of centuries of miscegenation, with a diverse set of phenotypic appearances.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Brazil's national identity includes elements of African,

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1. Brazilians talk more in terms of "color" than in terms of "race" in social discourse (Htun 2004). As our work contributes to the race and politics literature, and we aim to enable a conversation with that literature, we use racial identity and color identity interchangeably. Both color and race are social constructs as there are not strong biological underpinnings for the way societies think about them, but they both have strong consequences as they generate attitudes and behaviors that affect people's well-being based on their phenotypic appearances.

2. One intention of elites in motivating the miscegenation process was to reduce African influence in the population (Marx 1998).

European, Asian, and native cultures. Perhaps for these reasons, Brazil for many years maintained a cultural myth of being a color-blind racial democracy (Sousa and Nascimento 2008; Htun 2004; Telles 2004). This was consistent with the broader literature on race and politics in Latin America, which had mostly rested on the assumption that cleavages in these societies are based on social class but not on race (Degler 1971; Freyre 1946; Pierson 1942; Tannenbaum 1947).

Beginning in the 1950s, Florestan Fernandes labeled the idea of racial democracy in Brazil a myth (Telles 2004). Later, scholars would argue that race does affect political and social choices across Latin America but in more subtle ways than in the United States (Hanchard 1994; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000; Sawyer 2006; Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Telles 2004; Wade 1997). Race or color matters independent of socioeconomic status (Silva and Reis 2011), and it affects Afro-Brazilians' relations with state institutions such as the police force (Mitchell and Wood 1999). One of the obstacles in addressing discrimination based on phenotypes is the all-inclusive national ideology in these countries that promotes the creation of a new racial group that overlaps with nationality. In the case of Brazil, most people think of themselves as members of one large national group with a high level of variation in people's phenotypes as a result of high levels of inter-racial mixing. In effect, there can be no racism if almost everyone is a product of racial intermixing.

Not all groups accepted the myth of racial democracy. In particular, black Brazilians have a long history of resistance to institutions of slavery and later, inequality and racism.<sup>3</sup> Since democratization in the late 1980s, a growing black movement, or *movimento negro*, has sought to draw attention to the discrimination suffered by nonwhites and has pressured elites for policy changes to increase equality.<sup>4</sup>

The *movimento negro*, however, is not as large as one might expect given Brazil's large population of African origin. Scholars attribute the relatively small size of the movement to the fluidity of color identity. Because color identities are fairly flexible, anyone who can reasonably self-identify as nonblack does so because of the positive bias toward whiteness and because of the stigma associated with blackness (Bailey 2009; Telles 2004). Others have suggested that miscegenation has also prevented those of African descent from developing a distinct group identity as blacks (Hanchard 1994).

In spite of its limited size, the black movement has been successful in pushing for policy changes. Among Latin American countries, Brazil has taken an increasingly proactive stance to confront and address racial inequalities. Historically, left-wing parties in Brazil have worked closely with black movement leaders to increase representation in government and public policies (Johnson 2006). Such alliances have been successful in producing affirmative action policies in public schools and job opportunities over the last twenty years.

Interactions between an increasing awareness of racial inequalities and rac-

3. Especially notable were the *quilombos*, settlements of runaway slaves.

4. Darker-complexion Brazilians on average enjoy less access to education, lower life expectancy, lower wages, and even suffer discrimination in hiring and recruitment (IBGE 2010; IPEA 2000a, 2000b).

ist attitudes, the pressure on the elites by the Brazilian black movement, and international attention centered on the problem of racism have led to some policy changes. Most significant is affirmative action for the best universities and for some public hiring. These policies apply to all Afro-Brazilians, a category that includes self-identified black (*preto*) and brown (*pardo*) individuals (Htun 2004). According to the most recent census, Afro-Brazilians constitute 51 percent of the population (IBGE 2010). Racial inequality extends into the political sphere. Elected officials are disproportionately white, and Afro-Brazilians are especially underrepresented among the political elite. In a study of the Brazilian Congress from 1983 to 1999, Johnson (1998) finds ongoing and severe underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians in Congress and negative impacts of such underrepresentation on policy outcomes for Afro-Brazilians.

One possible explanation for the lack of diversity in elected positions is that prejudice among voters prevents the election of nonwhite candidates, but previous work on this question is limited. Most scholars have focused on turnout and support for democracy among Afro-Brazilians (Castro 1993; de Souza 1971; Lamounier 1968; Mitchell 2010; Prandi 1996; Soares and do Valle Silva 1987). Two exceptions are Berquó and Alencastro (1992) and Mitchell (2010), who find that self-identified Afro-Brazilians sometimes, but not always, express a preference for Afro-Brazilian candidates.

More recently, experimental work explores racial voting in Brazil, with surprising findings: voters are not to blame for political inequality, and Brazilian voters are essentially color-blind. Dunning (2010) reports on tests for racial and class effects on candidate preference. He showed Brazilian subjects videos of candidates, randomly varying the race of the actors, portraying the candidate from white to black, and using their clothing and the content of their speech to vary social class. He finds that although candidates' social class has a significant treatment effect, with a positive bias for wealthier and better-educated candidates, there is no independent treatment effect of race on vote choice. This is surprising, given the inequalities in descriptive representation, and also poses a question—if Brazilian voters are color-blind, why is there so little diversity among political elites?

In this article, we address the relationship between identity and voting behavior and contribute to the growing literature on race in Latin America. We test for the interaction of racial identity and ballot structure on voting behavior. Previous work has focused on simple two-candidate comparisons, but most entry-level political jobs in Brazil have dozens of candidates, and there are sometimes more than a thousand competing candidates on a legislative ballot.<sup>5</sup> Drawing on research from marketing and from political science, we argue that as ballot length increases, voters are overwhelmed by the challenges of making careful choices and fall back on simple cues, in this case, racial appearance. We test our hypotheses using an experiment conducted in São Paulo in June, July, and August 2011. Subjects were asked to choose between hypothetical candidates; we randomly varied candidate race and ballot length.

5. There are usually approximately one thousand candidates for the seventy federal deputy seats in São Paulo. Each voter must choose just one.

Our results find a complex interaction between race and ballot structure. For self-identified white and brown subjects, there are no race treatment effects for short ballots. But as the number of candidates increases, white and brown subjects fall back on race as an information shortcut and prefer white or black candidates, respectively. We interpret this effect as an implicit preference for same-race candidates. In contrast, self-identified black subjects show a consistent bias for black candidates regardless of ballot length. We interpret this pattern as an explicit racial preference and hypothesize that it could be the consequence of higher group cohesion among those respondents who self-identified as black. Both implications have striking parallels with research from the United States that has found latent racist attitudes that conflict with social norms of equality (Mendelberg 2001; Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Our results have implications for race in Brazil, institutional design, and the future of the Brazilian democracy.

In the next section, we synthesize the literature on race and group conflict, consider its implications for Brazil, and discuss the potential interaction of identity and ballot structure. We then report on the experiment we conducted in São Paulo. Finally we discuss some limitations and implications of our research.

#### EXISTING RESEARCH AND THEORY

A vast literature seeks to explain intergroup conflict, much of it examining race in the United States. Most of this literature fits in one of three broad theories of identity: social identity theory, social dominance theory, and system justification theory. Our interest is in how these theories predict racial prejudice in voting. Thus we will outline each theory's expectations for electoral behavior. We focus on the three predominant color or racial groups in Brazil: whites, blacks, and brown individuals.<sup>6</sup>

##### *Social identity theory*

According to this theory, identity develops from socially relevant attributes. Related empirical work shows that mere categorization is sufficient to provoke in-group bias and out-group prejudice (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel, Billig, and Bundy 1971). People have many identities—gender, race, nationality, and others—but only act on them when identities become relevant. In addition, self-esteem is partly a product of identity. Thus individuals seek identities that make them feel good about themselves and discard those that do not. In some cases individuals are unable to change their group identity because groups are clearly delimited. In this case, if their group identification is not socially valued, they may reinvent their identity to make it valuable (e.g., African Americans in the United States and the slogan “black is beautiful”).

According to Brazil's national identity, everyone is first and foremost Brazilian,

6. We follow scholars on race in Brazil writing in the English language by referring to Brazilians of mixed race as “brown” (c.f. Mitchell 2009; Johnson 1998; Htun 2004; Telles 2007). This term is a translation of the category *pardo* used in the Brazilian census when asking respondents about their color.

a product of centuries of miscegenation between different groups. In spite of this national ideology, Brazilians think of themselves as members of different color categories. If Brazil's national ideology had been successful, these color categories would not have any political consequences. The myth that color does not matter in Brazil was first challenged in the 1950s and largely discarded by the 1990s. A key part of the challenge to the racial myth was the black movement's demonstration of color-based inequalities in economic and social outcomes. By almost every measure, Brazilians with darker skin have worse economic, education, and health outcomes than do white Brazilians.

Scholars have shown that the idea of racial democracy and the sense of discrimination based on color coexist in Brazil (Telles 2004; Segato 1998). But while Brazil's national identity includes African roots, society still ascribes a positive value to whiteness. Consequently, those individuals who can phenotypically identify with a nonblack category do so in order to derive higher self-esteem. Thus social identity theory suggests that most of the people who choose to identify as black do so because they believe in the struggle of the black movement, and they will prefer voting for black candidates.<sup>7</sup> Voters who identify as white should prefer voting for white candidates because of the positive bias toward whiteness. The position of brown individuals under social identity theory is ambiguous. On the one hand, these individuals would derive higher self-esteem from associating with whites, who enjoy a higher social standing than blacks. On the other hand, evidence shows that their socioeconomic status is more closely related to blacks, as they are also grouped under the Afro-Brazilian category. Thus social identity theory predicts that if brown individuals seek to derive higher self-esteem they would likely vote for white candidates because they want to be closer to whites. In contrast, if they vote based on their socioeconomic status they might be more likely to vote for Afro-Brazilian (brown and black) candidates, who may provide better socioeconomic representation.

### *Social Dominance Theory*

According to this theory, all societies are hierarchically organized by both gender and race. The dominant group (usually male and, in the West, white) tends to justify its advantageous position in relation to the other groups based on the national ideology (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 2004). One foundation of this framework is that governmental institutions and ideologies are seen as mechanisms to maintain dominance over subordinated groups. A consequence is that subordinated groups do not feel a strong national attachment to or trust in governmental institutions (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 2004).

Empirical work exploring this theory finds contradictory evidence (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sinclair, Sidanius, and Levin 1998). In contrast with the United States and Israel, in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and

7. Of course some voters will identify as black because of their phenotypic appearance, but previous work shows that if they could, many might identify as brown (Banton 1998).

Puerto Rico darker-skinned people have been shown to be as or more patriotic than lighter-skinned people (Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius 2004). One possible reason for this level of patriotism is the inclusion of all members of society in the national creed through the ideology of miscegenation. Further testing of this theory in Brazil will show if the results from the Caribbean prevail there.

Research in Brazil points out the inclusiveness of the country's national ideology, as it includes African, European, and native elements (Degler 1971; Pierson 1942). In spite of such inclusiveness, members of the black movement argue that the ideology of miscegenation maintains nonwhite people at the bottom of the social hierarchy and prevents their mobilization and political organization. In terms of voting, social dominance implies that voters will vote for members of their own group—the dominators in order to continue domination, and the disadvantaged group to try to change the status quo. Thus nonwhite voters should vote for nonwhite candidates while white voters should vote for white candidates; that is, same-color voting.<sup>8</sup>

### *System Justification Theory*

This theory is similar to the social dominance approach in that it conceives societies to be hierarchically organized. The disagreement is that according to system justification theory, members of discriminated groups internalize stereotypes and believe their social situation is justifiable (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). Research in Mexico shows that indigenous-looking voters are more likely than white voters to vote for white-looking candidates and tend to evaluate those candidates more positively than white voters do. Moreover, Mexicans tend to ascribe more negative traits to dark-skinned than to light-skinned individuals (Aguilar 2009, 2011).

In the case of Brazil, for most of the twentieth century, national identity rested on the idea that no one discriminates against others based on racial appearance. Although Brazilian society now acknowledges color discrimination, Brazilians also value the ideas of miscegenation and of a racism-free society (Telles 2004). Thus, if there is a preference for whiteness among some nonwhite Brazilians, they should tend to vote for white candidates more than for nonwhite ones. In the case of nonwhite individuals who share the ideas of the black movement and identify as black we can expect more support for black candidates as they will be conscious of the positive bias toward whiteness. Furthermore, these voters will not justify their unequal position vis-à-vis whites, as system justification theory predicts.

### *When Are Racial Identities Activated in Politics?*

In practice, racial identity will frequently compete with other political identities, including partisanship, economic interest, ideology, and religion. In addition, social norms of equality may dissuade voters from explicitly using racial charac-

8. Of course, people from the dominated group might not trust the electoral process, but if given the option to vote for a member of their group they would do so.

teristics when choosing candidates. But when there are secondary or latent racial preferences and few clear cues to guide voting behavior, voters may fall back on these preferences when choosing candidates. Racial preferences might require some deliberate activation through media messages (Mendelberg 2001) or might simply be the most accessible cue in some circumstances.

A key part of our experiment is an analysis of the way that features of the electoral environment affect the use of racial identity in voting. We propose that racial identity's impact on behavior will increase as voting becomes more complex and burdensome for citizens. Essentially, race remains an easy-to-use information shortcut for many voters. When voting decisions are difficult, voters will rely on racial identities more and political identities less.<sup>9</sup>

We focus on the cognitive challenges provided to voters by large choice sets—elections with many candidates and low information. Across political systems, voters face diverse informational challenges, depending on the strength of partisan brands, the length of political campaigns, and most important for this study, the number of candidates.<sup>10</sup> Just within Latin America, we observe wide variance in the number of candidates. In some contexts, there are rarely more than two candidates, yet in Brazilian legislative elections, voters may face as many as one thousand candidates in a single district. This abundance of candidates results largely from political institutions—high-magnitude legislative districts, low costs for candidates' entry, and high thresholds for the number of candidates per party list—as well as Brazil's fragmented party system. As Carey and Hix (2011) observe, the cognitive challenges facing voters in systems like Brazil's have received very little attention in political science.

Previous work in other fields shows how choice set size can have powerful effects on decision making (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Iyengar and Kamenica 2010; Schwartz et al. 2002). In one study, Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) show that when presented with larger choice sets when selecting 401k plans, experimental subjects tended to avoid complexity and risk. In another study, Lenton and Francesconi (2010) analyze speed-dating events and find that participants presented with larger numbers of potential mates were more likely to rely on "quick and easy cues," including age, height, and weight, when assessing potential mates. Respondents who were presented with fewer candidates, on the other hand, were more likely to rely on less quick and easy cues, including occupation or education. In political science, recent work finds that voters are more likely to abstain when presented with more candidates, and that the presence of party labels does little to mitigate this effect (Cunow 2014).

We hypothesize that ballot size will have different effects on voters' electoral decisions, following the theories of intergroup conflict previously discussed. First, we will test whether voters' racial identities are strong, affecting their behavior

9. Of course racial and political identity can in many cases be strongly related. These two identities can be more related when race or color differences reflect disparities among members of different categories, as it is the case in Brazil (i.e., differences between whites and Afro-Brazilians.)

10. Voter characteristics, including education, may also influence the extent to which elections are challenging (Gallego 2010).



even when they have to decide among only a few candidates. If racial cues trigger voters' racial identities when they can compare candidates more carefully and at a low cost, then those identities are highly relevant for voters. In this scenario, according to social identity and social dominance theories voters should always prefer candidates from their own group over candidates from other groups. In contrast, social justification theory would predict that all voters will prefer white candidates—white voters will vote for a member of their group to maintain their privilege and nonwhite voters will vote for a white politician because they believe white politicians are more capable than members of their own groups.

In case racial identities are not strong enough to affect voting decisions with a few candidates, we will test whether they do affect voters when they are presented with many candidates. We hypothesize that ballot size affects the way voters make use of or ignore sociodemographic cues, especially latent cues, when making electoral decisions. If voters' racial attitudes are weak or latent, they should not be activated when confronting a small choice set. When facing ten or more candidates, finding an optimal candidate is difficult for most voters, in addition to being exceedingly costly. In this context, voters should fall back on simple cues that could trigger one of their identities—including racial identity—and use those cues to make decisions.<sup>11</sup> The experiment we employ varies candidate race and the size of choice sets simultaneously to allow us to test the relationship between candidate race and ballot length.

#### HYPOTHESES

The above discussion suggests the following hypotheses to be tested:

Hypothesis 1: Brazilian voters will vote according to their own racial identification (in-group bias) and will tend to punish members of other groups (out-group prejudice), following both social identity and social dominance theories.

Hypothesis 2: Brazilian voters will vote for white candidates according to system justification theory. The exception would be Brazilians who identify with the black movement, who should be more likely to vote for black candidates.

Hypothesis 3: Whatever the racial identity construct, Brazilian voters should rely more on racial cues as the number of candidates increases and voting decisions become more difficult.

In the next section, we present our experimental design and discuss implementation, balance, and treatments.

#### METHODOLOGY

To test the relationship between the race of political candidates and vote choice (hypotheses 1–3), we conducted a survey experiment in São Paulo, Brazil, from

11. This reliance on cues may be entirely rational. A low-information rationale and reliance on information shortcuts can be a highly effective means by which voters can make rational choices without acquiring information about options (Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994).

*Table 1 Summary statistics*

	Sample
<b>Age</b>	
Median	29
<b>Education</b>	
$x < \text{primary}$	7.2%
$\text{Primary} \leq x < \text{middle}$	13.1%
$\text{Middle} \leq x < \text{high}$	59.1%
$\text{High} \leq x$	20.7%
<b>Income</b>	
$x < \text{R500}$	7.3%
$\text{R500} \leq x < \text{R1500}$	30.7%
$\text{R1500} \leq x < \text{R3000}$	31.6%
$\text{R3000} \leq x$	30.5%
<b>Political interest</b>	
None	22.8%
A little	42.4%
Interested	25.8%
Very interested	9.1%

June to August 2011.<sup>12</sup> A total of 1,175 adults participated. Subjects were sampled in a diverse set of busy commercial areas across the city including the Avenida Paulista, Vila Mariana, Liberdade, Tatuapé, and the Centro. Respondents were asked to participate in an academic study about political attitudes.<sup>13</sup>

Respondent characteristics are summarized in table 1. Political interest and education variables are measured on four-point scales with one representing the lowest and four representing the highest values of the variable. The median respondent was twenty-nine years old, earned between R\$1,500 and R\$3,000 monthly, had completed less than a high school education, and had only a little interest in politics. This sample was slightly younger, wealthier, and better educated than the universe of São Paulo residents.

Survey respondents were presented with profiles of hypothetical candidates and asked which of the presented candidates they preferred. Candidate profiles included candidates' names, photos, brief biographies, and policy positions. Subjects were also asked a set of questions about their own income, education, political interest, party affiliation, and race.

12. The black movement has been active in São Paulo since the 1930s, making it an interesting place to research racial attitudes (Covin 2006; Hanchard 1994; Mitchell 2010).

13. The completion rate for respondents who began the survey was 95 percent. We do not have a precise measure of the survey response rate. We estimate that half of adults approached chose to participate in the survey.

Table 2 *Experimental conditions*

Number of candidates	Race of candidates
3	No photos
3	All white
3	White and black
3	White and Japanese
3	White and mixed race
6	All white
6	White and black
12	All white
12	White and black

We randomized two variables: candidate race and ballot length. Respondents were randomly assigned to conditions in which they were presented with three, six, or twelve candidates. For each ballot size, one-third of candidates' races were varied by changing their photographs; the other two-thirds of hypothetical candidates were held constant. The pictures were randomly varied to show white, black, brown, or Japanese males. There was also one experimental condition with no photos at all. All other information about the candidates was held constant across experiment conditions.<sup>14</sup>

Table 2 presents the nine experimental conditions into which respondents were assigned. Figure 1 shows sample candidate profiles from the three-candidate condition with all white candidates and from the condition with white and black candidates.<sup>15</sup>

RESULTS

Figure 2 reports on the randomization, showing sample means and 95 percent confidence intervals for our six covariates across the experimental treatment conditions. None differed significantly across the six treatment conditions, confirming that the randomization was successful.

We also assessed subjects' perceptions of realism. The final survey question asked voters if the profiles of the candidates were similar to or different from the profiles of the candidates in the last election. Figure 3 shows responses: 83 percent of respondents reported that the experimental candidates were the same (67.67 percent) or only a little different (14.92 percent). Indeed, many respondents reported being familiar with or knowing them despite the candidates being completely hypothetical!<sup>16</sup>

14. The last name of the Japanese candidate was also changed to reflect the candidate's ethnicity.  
15. The original conditions were printed in full color. Copies of the originals are available from the authors.  
16. This reported familiarity with the candidates may also suggest some social desire on the part of respondents to appear knowledgeable about politics. It also reflects the low-information environment that characterizes Brazilian legislative elections, in which many voters have only very limited knowledge of many of their options.




	<p><b>Sérgio Augusto Ribeiro</b></p> <p>Sérgio é advogado graduado pela Universidade de São Paulo. Após concluir a universidade, trabalhou em um escritório de advocacia, antes de decidir dedicar a sua vida à política. Desde então, trabalhou no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo, onde serviu como uma ligação entre os legisladores estaduais e os juízes. Sérgio também tem trabalhado como agente do Ministério Federal da Justiça. Ele é casado com Juliana e tem dois filhos: Thiago, 12 anos, e Renata, 9 anos.</p>
<p><b>Impostos:</b></p>	<p>Sérgio vai aumentar os impostos sobre os ricos, a fim de aumentar os gastos governamentais em serviços sociais voltados para os pobres</p>
<p><b>Saúde:</b></p>	<p>Para assegurar que as pessoas tenham acesso à saúde pública de qualidade, Sérgio vai construir novos hospitais e centros de saúde e contratar mais médicos.</p>
<p><b>Meio Ambiente:</b></p>	<p>Sérgio pretende proteger a Amazônia, e, ao mesmo tempo, desenvolver um programa sustentável para permitir que os pequenos agricultores se beneficiem de uma parte da floresta tropical.</p>
	<p><b>Fernando Lopes Damazio</b></p> <p>Fernando se formou em economia pela Universidade de Campinas. Desde que decidiu seguir uma vida na política, ele trabalha como assessor na Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo, ajudando a planejar o orçamento do estado. Ele também trabalhou para o Ministério da Fazenda como consultor fiscal. Fernando deu aulas na Universidade de Brasília. Ele e sua esposa, Viviane têm dois filhos: João, 10 anos, e Gabriel, 6 anos.</p>
<p><b>Impostos:</b></p>	<p>A fim de aumentar os gastos públicos, Fernando pretende aumentar os impostos igualmente para todos os cidadãos.</p>
<p><b>Saúde:</b></p>	<p>Fernando criará programas de treinamento para médicos e enfermeiros para melhorar a qualidade do atendimento.</p>
<p><b>Meio Ambiente:</b></p>	<p>Fernando propõe proteger a Amazônia e permitir que empresas privadas aproveitem os seus recursos, desde que apresentem um plano de reflorestamento aprovado pelo governo.</p>
	<p><b>Leonardo Coelho da Silva</b></p> <p>Leonardo se formou na Universidade de São Paulo, onde estudou contabilidade. Depois de completar seus estudos Leonardo trabalhou como contador privado. Após decidir se dedicar à vida política, ele trabalhou como chefe de gabinete e como gerente de campanha de um deputado estadual em São Paulo. Leonardo também trabalhou como consultor de orçamento para o Ministério de Minas e Energia. Ele é casado com Ana Carolina e tem dois filhos: David, 11 anos, e Isabel, 7 anos.</p>
<p><b>Impostos:</b></p>	<p>Leonardo vai reduzir os impostos a fim de onerar menos as pessoas e estimular a economia, mesmo que isso signifique cortar gastos públicos</p>
<p><b>Saúde:</b></p>	<p>Leonardo irá fornecer mais incentivos para os prestadores privados de saúde abram novos hospitais e clínicas, permitindo que as pessoas tenham acesso a serviços privados de qualidade.</p>
<p><b>Meio Ambiente:</b></p>	<p>A fim de criar mais empregos e estimular a economia do país, Leonardo propõe dar acesso à Amazônia a empresas privadas e estrangeiras.</p>

Figure 1 Three-candidate conditions: (a) white Fernando (b) black Fernando

### Sérgio Augusto Ribeiro



Sérgio é advogado graduado pela Universidade de São Paulo. Após concluir a universidade, trabalhou em um escritório de advocacia, antes de decidir dedicar a sua vida à política. Desde então, trabalhou no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo, onde serviu como uma ligação entre os legisladores estaduais e os juizes. Sérgio também tem trabalhado como agente do Ministério Federal da Justiça. Ele é casado com Juliana e tem dois filhos: Thiago, 12 anos, e Renata, 9 anos.

**Impostos:**

Sérgio vai aumentar os impostos sobre os ricos, a fim de aumentar os gastos governamentais em serviços sociais voltados para os pobres

**Saúde:**

Para assegurar que as pessoas tenham acesso à saúde pública de qualidade, Sérgio vai construir novos hospitais e centros de saúde e contratar mais médicos.

**Meio Ambiente:**

Sérgio pretende proteger a Amazônia, e, ao mesmo tempo, desenvolver um programa sustentável para permitir que os pequenos agricultores se beneficiem de uma parte da floresta tropical.

### Fernando Lopes Damazio



Fernando se formou em economia pela Universidade de Campinas. Desde que decidiu seguir uma vida na política, ele trabalha como assessor na Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo, ajudando a planejar o orçamento do estado. Ele também trabalhou para o Ministério da Fazenda como consultor fiscal. Fernando deu aulas na Universidade de Brasília. Ele e sua esposa, Viviane têm dois filhos: João, 10 anos, e Gabriel, 6 anos.

**Impostos:**

A fim de aumentar os gastos públicos, Fernando pretende aumentar os impostos igualmente para todos os cidadãos.

**Saúde:**

Fernando criará programas de treinamento para médicos e enfermeiros para melhorar a qualidade do atendimento.

**Meio Ambiente:**

Fernando propõe proteger a Amazônia e permitir que empresas privadas aproveitem os seus recursos, desde que apresentem um plano de reflorestamento aprovado pelo governo.

### Leonardo Coelho da Silva



Leonardo se formou na Universidade de São Paulo, onde estudou contabilidade. Depois de completar seus estudos Leonardo trabalhou como contador privado. Após decidir se dedicar à vida política, ele trabalhou como chefe de gabinete e como gerente de campanha de um deputado estadual em São Paulo. Leonardo também trabalhou como consultor de orçamento para o Ministério de Minas e Energia. Ele é casado com Ana Carolina e tem dois filhos: David, 11 anos, e Isabel, 7 anos.

**Impostos:**


Leonardo vai reduzir os impostos a fim de onerar menos as pessoas e estimular a economia, mesmo que isso signifique cortar gastos públicos

**Saúde:**

Leonardo irá fornecer mais incentivos para os prestadores privados de saúde abram novos hospitais e clínicas, permitindo que as pessoas tenham acesso a serviços privados de qualidade.

**Meio Ambiente:**

A fim de criar mais empregos e estimular a economia do país, Leonardo propõe dar acesso à Amazônia a empresas privadas e estrangeiras.



Sample Means with 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 2 Covariate balance across treatment conditions




Figure 3 How different are survey candidates and candidates in the last election?

Only 8.3 percent of subjects found our candidates very different, and of these, few could describe any differences when asked. The few who could state why our hypothetical candidates were different usually reported that the policy positions of the hypothetical candidates were too well defined or that the candidates were too well educated. Coincidentally, the format of our candidate profiles was also strikingly similar to a profile of an interim cabinet minister that appeared in a major Brazilian newspaper while the survey was being conducted (Nery and Falcão 2011).

These figures provide confidence that the candidate profiles in the survey were sufficiently realistic. We note that most legislative candidates have low name recognition, almost no media coverage, and extremely limited television advertising time; most legislative candidates have no more than a few seconds of advertising time during which they quickly state their name, party, and perhaps one other piece of information. The brief time that survey respondents spent evaluating the hypothetical candidates may be a reasonable approximation of how much exposure voters have to legislative candidates.

We now turn to our main results. Simple cross tabulations of the data show no treatment effect of candidate race, supporting the notion of Brazil as a racial democracy. Table 3 shows results from all the three-candidate conditions with no picture, black, white, brown, and Japanese candidates. The cells report the proportion of subjects voting for the candidate (Fernando) whose race was varied in each of the conditions. The results suggest two main findings. First, race appears not to matter to Brazilian voters. The proportion voting for Fernando (the “treatment” candidate) barely varies from 0.18 to 0.22 across all conditions with pictures, and these differences are not significant ( $p$ -value for a chi-squared test = 0.94). Second, Brazilian voters appear not to like any of our pictures of Fernando, as his vote share is substantially higher in the no-picture treatment than in any other condition!

Our next hypotheses address the size of the choice set. Previous work (Iyengar and Kamenica 2010; Lenton and Francesconi 2010; Cunow 2014) has shown how individuals make less careful choices or rely on simpler cues when their options increase. We hypothesized that while race might not affect vote choice

Table 3 Proportion voting for treatment candidate by race:  
Three-candidate condition

	Treatment candidate picture				
	No picture	White	Brown	Black	Japanese
Treatment	0.28	0.18	0.22	0.21	0.21
Control	0.72	0.82	0.78	0.79	0.79
<i>n</i>	151	160	145	152	155

Notes: With “no picture”: Chi-square: 4.62;  $p$  value: 0.33  
Without “no picture”: Chi-square: 0.39;  $p$  value: 0.94  
None of these differences reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Table 4 *Proportion voting for treatment candidates by candidate race and by number of candidates*

	Candidate race		
	White	Black	Difference
3	0.181 (160)	0.211 (152)	0.029
6	0.243 (144)	0.276 (152)	0.033
12	0.172 (145)	0.252 (159)	0.079
All	0.198 (449)	0.246 (463)	0.048

*Note:* None of these differences reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

when faced with only three candidates, as the number of candidates increases and subjects are overwhelmed with information, we expect they will fall back on easily accessible cues. One obvious cue would be race (we did not provide information about the party affiliations of the candidates in this experiment, and in fact, most legislative candidates’ advertisements do not mention party identification) (Desposato 2013).

Table 4 shows the proportion of subjects voting for the treatment candidates when subjects had to choose between three, six, or twelve candidates in total. In each treatment, one-third of the candidates were treatment candidates, meaning we varied their photographs. For the larger choice sets, we only varied black and white candidates; for comparability, in the following paragraphs, we focus only on the black- and white-candidate treatments for all choice set sizes.

The results are consistent with table 3; there is no evidence of racially motivated voting in aggregate analysis. In this case, there is a consistent pattern of a slight pro-black bias in voting; the proportion voting for Fernando when black is consistently higher than the proportion voting for Fernando when white, and this gap increases with the number of candidates from less than 3 percent for three candidates to almost 8 percent for the twelve-candidate condition. However, this pattern is not statistically significant. Taken together, tables 3 and 4 reveal no aggregate racial preference among Brazilian voters, supporting the core idea of racial democracy.

The results change fundamentally, however, when we control for subjects’ racial self-identification: we find a significant preference for candidates whose race matches subjects’ identity. Consider first table 5. The values in the table are the proportion voting for the treatment candidates as a function of the number of candidates (rows), the race of the candidate (columns) and the self-identified race of the subject (groups of columns). Values in parentheses are the number of subjects in each treatment, and asterisks denote the significance level of the treatment effect from a difference-in-proportions test.



Table 5 Proportion voting for treatment candidates by candidate race, subject race, and by number of candidates

	White subject			Brown subject			Black subject		
	Candidate race:			Candidate race:			Candidate race:		
	White	Black	Diff	White	Black	Diff	White	Black	Diff
3	0.2 (55)	0.183 (71)	0.017	0.2 (75)	0.221 (68)	-0.021	0.107 (28)	0.4 (10)	-0.293***
6	0.222 (36)	0.261 (69)	-0.039	0.225 (80)	0.242 (62)	-0.017	0.296 (27)	0.421 (19)	-0.125
12	0.206 (63)	0.109 (55)	0.097	0.143 (56)	0.276 (76)	-0.133**	0.174 (23)	0.462 (26)	-0.288***
All	0.208 (154)	0.19 (195)	0.018	0.194 (211)	0.248 (206)	-0.053	0.192 (78)	0.436 (55)	-0.244***

\*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

These results show divergent patterns in candidate preferences as a function of identity and the number of candidates. For blacks, there is a consistent and usually significant preference for nonwhite candidates: about 40 percent of blacks chose a black candidate regardless of ballot length; voting for white treatment candidates was consistently lower. For the three-candidate condition, a black Fernando's vote share is nearly four times greater than the vote share of white Fernando; for the six-candidate condition, the two treatment candidates get 42 percent more votes when black than when white, and for the twelve-candidate condition, the four treatment candidates' vote shares more than double when the candidates are black compared to when they are white. All these differences are significant at the 0.05 level.

For whites and self-identified browns, there appears to be an interaction between choice set size and preferences. For both races, there is no apparent treatment effect in the three-candidate condition; white voters have a two-percentage-point preference for white candidates; brown subjects have a two-percentage-point preference for black candidates, and neither gap is significant.

As choice set size increases, however, so do the gaps. There is little change from three to six candidates, but from six to twelve candidates, there is a large increase in preference for same-race candidates. For whites in the twelve-candidate condition, there is a ten-percentage-point increase in votes for the treatment candidates when they are white versus when they are black; this preference doubles self-identified whites' preference for those treatment candidates. This difference, however, does not reach conventional levels of significance with just 118 subjects in the two twelve-candidate treatments. For brown subjects exposed to the twelve-candidate conditions, there is a thirteen-percentage-point gap, significant at the 0.05 level, between preference for the treatment candidates when they are black versus when they are white. Again, this nearly doubles those candidates' vote shares.

To further explore these relationships, we ran a series of logistic regressions, shown in tables 6 and 7. The dependent variable in each of these models is a dummy variable "Voted for Treatment," coded "1" if the subject voted for one of our treatment candidates and "0" if the subject voted for one of our control candidates with invariant race. We constructed three sets of models to estimate the impacts of increasingly nuanced racial effects. Note that all models include controls for age, gender, education, and interest in politics, though these controls are not always shown. Further, age is operationalized as a dummy variable for "40 or older" (coded 0 for subjects under 40 years of age). Our coding captures the difference between subjects who became adults under authoritarian rule and those who became adults under democratic rule.

In the first two models (1 and 2, table 6), there are no controls for the respondents' race, just controls for the candidate race and number of candidates. There were no significant racial effects in these models.

In the second set of models (3 and 4, table 6), we test for same-race preferences. We define an indicator variable, *Congruent Race*, coded 1 if the subject and the treatment candidates have the same race and 0 if their races differ. For example, when the subject self-identifies as white and the treatment candidates

Table 6 Voting for treatment candidates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Black Candidate	0.248 (1.49)	0.0138 (0.04)		
Number of Candidates		−0.0205 (−0.61)	−0.00551 (−0.25)	−0.0520 (−1.52)
Black Cand × Num Cand		0.0335 (0.75)		
Congruent Race			0.321* (1.92)	−0.259 (−0.73)
Congruent Race × Num Cand				0.0836* (1.85)
Woman	0.0783 (0.46)	0.0807 (0.48)	0.0789 (0.47)	0.0882 (0.52)
Political Interest	0.00896 (0.10)	0.00824 (0.09)	0.0125 (0.13)	0.0101 (0.11)
Education	−0.223** (−2.17)	−0.218** (−2.11)	−0.213** (−2.06)	−0.216** (−2.09)
Over 40 Years	−0.455** (−2.23)	−0.4648** (−2.27)	−0.470** (−2.30)	−0.475** (−2.32)
Constant	−0.657* (−1.78)	−0.528 (−1.25)	−0.675* (−1.71)	−0.364 (−0.85)
Observations	834	834	834	834

Note: *t* statistics in parentheses.  
\**p* < .10; \*\**p* < .05.

are randomly assigned to have white pictures, Congruent Race is coded 1. When subjects are not white, and the treatment candidates are also nonwhite, we also code the same-race indicator as 1. As we have discussed, previous research shows that browns and blacks have similar life experiences, so they are usually grouped under the Afro-Brazilian category (Htun 2004; Telles 2004).

The results from model 4 suggest a strong interaction between racial identity, candidate race, and ballot size. We provide a more intuitive presentation in figure 4. The figure shows the marginal effect of the main treatment (having a black versus white candidate) as a function of ballot length.<sup>17</sup> Note that for small ballots—those with just three candidates—there are no racial effects. The marginal effect of a same-race candidate has an estimate very close to zero, and the 95 percent confidence interval straddles the zero or “no effect” line. Subjects are equally likely to choose candidates with the same or different races as their own. However, as the number of candidates increases, the role of same-race candidates also increases. With six candidates, there is a positive effect, though it is not sig-

17. The *y* axis is measured as the linear impact on the latent variable. Abbreviating Congruent Race as  $I_{cr}$  and given the original model of:  
 $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{cr} + \beta_2 m + \beta_3 I_{cr} * m + X\beta + \varepsilon$   
where  $I_{cr}$  is the indicator variable for same race,  $m$  is the number of candidates,  $X\beta$  are controls, and  $\varepsilon$  is iid logistic, the marginal effect of a racially congruent candidate given number of candidates  $m$  is:  $\partial Y / \partial I_{cr} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 * m$ .




Figure 4 *Marginal effects of congruent candidates*

nificant at the 95 percent level. However, by the time ballot length has grown to twelve candidates, subjects show a significant bias toward candidates that share their group identity status.

For a more substantive illustration of impact, we compare the probability that a hypothetical individual with all control variables set to median values will vote for a treatment candidate, varying the number of candidates and whether the individual and treatment candidate are of the same race. When there are just three candidates, the probability of voting for a treatment candidate is essentially unchanged regardless of race: the probability is 0.256 for a same-race candidate and 0.257 for a different-race candidate. When there are twelve candidates, the probability of voting for a treatment candidate increases to 0.31 for a same-race candidate and falls to 0.18 for a different-race candidate.

We tested a more nuanced story in models 1 and 2 in table 7. In these models, we test separately for treatment effects for self-identified white, brown, and black respondents, following the patterns observed in table 5. We also interact age and the race of the candidate to test for generational differences. There are multiple and messy interactions in the model. The baseline racial category is the brown group, so the interactions capture differences between white and brown, and between black and brown respondents. Again, because their meaning is difficult for most to decipher from the table directly, we provide figure 4 to illustrate the marginal effect of having a black (versus white) treatment candidate for each racial group and each ballot size.<sup>18</sup>

18. The reader may be wondering about the few significant coefficients in the tables and the apparent contradiction with the significant findings presented in the figures. It is essential to remember that the marginal effect of any variable and its significance depend on any main effects and interactions in which it participates. For example, given a simple linear model:

$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_1 x_2$   
the estimated marginal effect of  $x_1$  is  $\beta_1^* + \beta_3^* x_2$ , and the standard error of that marginal effect is

Table 7 Voting for treatment candidates accounting for respondent race

	Model 1	Model 2
Black Candidate	−0.521 (−1.00)	−0.304 (−0.57)
Number of Candidates	−0.0650 (−1.24)	−0.0616 (−1.17)
Black Cand × Num Cand	0.107 (1.56)	0.106 (1.54)
White Respondent	−0.487 (−0.84)	−0.496 (−0.86)
White Respondent × Black Cand	0.956 (1.22)	0.959 (1.22)
White Respondent × Num Cand	0.0619 (0.84)	0.0651 (0.88)
White Respondent × Num Cand × Black Cand	−0.183* (−1.80)	−0.190* (−1.86)
Black Respondent	−0.885 (−1.16)	−0.894 (−1.18)
Black Respondent × Black Cand	1.742 (1.61)	1.789 (1.64)
Black Respondent × Num Cand	0.113 (1.16)	0.113 (1.17)
Black Respondent × Num Cand × Black Cand	−0.118 (−0.91)	−0.117 (−0.89)
Over 40 Years	−0.518** (−2.49)	−0.0604 (−0.21)
Age × Black Cand		−0.918** (−2.23)
Constant	−0.266 (−0.53)	−0.394 (−0.78)
Observations	834	834

Notes: Some control variables not shown.

*t* statistics in parentheses.

\**p* < .10; \*\**p* < .05.

The marginal effects mirror the descriptive analysis above but only sometimes reach conventional significance levels. For self-identified black respondents, the marginal effect of a black candidate is a significant increase in the propensity to choose that candidate. For black respondents under forty years of age, that increase in preference has nothing to do with ballot size, however; it is remarkably steady across the number of candidates and is significant at the 95 percent level for every ballot size tested. These results suggest an explicit and deliberate preference for black candidates among self-identified, young black

$$\sqrt{\sigma_{\hat{\beta}_1}^2 + x_2^2 \sigma_{\hat{\beta}_1}^2 + x_2^2 cov(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3)}$$

See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) for an extended discussion.




Figure 5 Marginal effect of black candidate by ballot size, respondent race, and respondent

voters. For older black respondents, the effect is still consistent but smaller and no longer significant. This finding supports the research that shows that younger Brazilians tend to identify as black (*negro*) more than older Brazilians, and they are also more influenced by the black movement than older people (Bailey and Telles 2006; Sansone 2003). Furthermore, using survey data, Mitchell (2010) shows that as Afro-Brazilians get older they tend to report fewer experiences of racism than younger Brazilians. All this evidence explains the strong preference of young and self-identified black Brazilians for black candidates, regardless of ballot size.

For white and brown respondents, there are interactions between the number of candidates and the presence of a black candidate, mirroring the same-race results discussed above. For white respondents, increasing the number of candidates leads to a negative treatment effect: those respondents become less likely to choose the treatment candidate if he is black. In addition, these effects are largest

for older white subjects and weaker for younger white subjects, but they never reach conventional levels of significance.

For brown respondents, increasing the number of candidates leads to a positive treatment effect: those respondents are more likely to choose a treatment candidate when he is black. Results for brown respondents are significant, but only for the twelve-candidate case with younger respondents.

The results suggest two patterns of racial voting. For white and brown respondents, when facing just three choices, their decisions appear to have nothing to do with race. This is consistent with our observations that subjects in the three-candidate treatments would carefully consider the biographies and positions of the candidates. In fact they took longer on average to examine their three candidates than other subjects took to examine all twelve candidates! When asked about their motivations for choosing candidates, those in the three-candidate condition had substantive reasons, including candidates' positions on specific issues or their educational or professional backgrounds. As the number of candidates increased, however, subjects took less time to choose a candidate, were more likely to "just pick one," and made fewer mentions of substantive reasons. In other words, when faced with a daunting analysis problem, our subjects made the decision to use a shortcut, rather than tackle the difficult challenge of picking the ideal candidate from all twelve. With less ability to analyze issues, subjects fell back on simple decision-making cues like race, which triggered their racial identities.

For black respondents, there appears to be a strong and deliberate favorable response to black candidates, and this response is apparent even when subjects are not overwhelmed by information. This is consistent with the message of the growing black movement in Brazil. In Brazil, people's decision of how to identify is often highly political.<sup>19</sup> On the one hand, the brown category stresses Brazil's national ideology, which rests on interracial mixing. On the other hand, identifying as black puts the individual in opposition to such ideology. It should not be surprising, then, that research shows that people who identify as blacks tend to be more educated than those who identify as brown (Telles 2004; Bailey and Telles 2006). People who self-identify as blacks tend to have a stronger identity with their group than brown individuals, who most likely feel ambiguous about identifying as black or white. Indeed, in political campaigns, black candidates often make explicit appeals to the black movement for support (Mitchell 2009). Therefore we can expect that self-identified blacks will be more likely to support black candidates, while brown individuals will feel ambiguous about them and support them only when they rely on cues (Bailey and Telles 2006).

## DISCUSSION

We have three central findings. First, when faced with small choice sets, self-identified white and brown subjects had no significant racial preference in voting. Second, as the size of the choice set grew, both white and brown subjects showed

19. As we mention above, in some cases identification may be entirely based on phenotype.

increasing preferences for same-race candidates. Finally, self-identified black subjects showed strong and consistent preferences for black candidates across all choice set sizes. In other words, racial or color identification is stronger among self-identified black voters and weaker among self-identified brown and white voters. Racial identity is always salient for self-identified blacks and is salient for self-identified white and brown voters when the number of candidates competing in the election is large.

The results of our experiment provide support for both social identity theory and social dominance theory: Brazilians tend to prefer candidates from their own racial group, and brown individuals are more likely to prefer black candidates only when they are presented with many options. As we discuss elsewhere, brown individuals' status is closer to that of blacks than to that of whites in Brazil, so it should not be surprising that they tend to prefer black candidates (Telles 2007). The results of our analysis of the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey indicate that black Brazilians are no less patriotic than white or brown Brazilians (LAPOP 2010).<sup>20</sup> This evidence echoes other work in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Puerto Rico that shows that national ideologies in Latin America tend to be more inclusionary than in the United States (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius 2004). Thus, based on the experiment and survey results, social identity theory better explains electoral behavior among members of different racial/color groups in Brazil.

Our findings show that race matters for voting behavior in Brazil, especially as the set of options increases in low-information elections such as legislative ones. We did not find evidence to support the idea that nonwhite Brazilians would prefer voting for white candidates, as system justification theory would claim and as research in other countries in Latin America has shown (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Aguilar 2009).

Our results also fit well with existing research on the campaign strategies of candidates for local and federal legislative offices in Brazil. Mitchell (2009) finds that some, but not all, Afro-Brazilian legislative candidates employ Afro-Brazilian cultural symbols and racial cues in their campaigns, referring to racial discrimination and even black social movements in the United States and South Africa when targeting voters. This work suggests that some candidates target voters based on Afro-Brazilian identity and that self-identified black Brazilians might rely on candidate race when selecting representatives because it is in fact a somewhat reliable signal (or at least of higher quality than other quick cues) for those voters.

Some of the nuances of our results are intriguing but will require more research in the future. We note three reasons for caution in our interpretation. First, our results need replication and expansion to generalize to all of Brazil and beyond. Our limited sample size spread across nine treatments means that our tests

20. The survey consists of 2,482 respondents. Respondents answered two questions related to patriotism: whether they felt proud of being Brazilians and whether they felt proud of living under the Brazilian political system. Looking at differences of means among racial groups on these two variables we did not find statistical differences. There are no discernible differences between white, brown, and black individuals in regard to feeling proud of being Brazilian ( $F = 0.20$ ,  $p$  value = 0.28) or expressing pride of living under the Brazilian political system ( $F = 1.39$ ,  $p$  value = 0.25).



have limited power. Some intriguing patterns were only significant at the 0.10 level. Related to this, our study pool is neither a random sample of all *paulistanos* nor of all Brazilians. A larger sample of poorer Brazilians might yield very different results, and studies in other states in Brazil with very different demographics would be instructive. Further investigation with larger and more diverse subject pools is required.

Second, the age-differentiated results are also suggestive but have many possible explanations. We found that age interacts with candidate race in determining vote choice. The racial effects noted above were strongest for young voters and weaker for older voters. We believe that this reflects the new discourse and experiences in Brazil since democratization. Discourse since the 1990s argues that Afro-Brazilians face discrimination based on color in many areas of their lives, so younger voters socialized under this new discourse might be more willing to accept such ideas and rely more on their racial/color identity when voting than older voters who grew up under the ideology of a racial democracy. The change in discourse could also strengthen the position of the black movement among younger Brazilians.

Third, our research design does not allow us to compare the magnitude of racial effects with those provided by other cues, like gender, party identification, or social networks. These other factors may have larger or small effects than race, and future work should parse out the relative impact of these different cues.

A key innovation in this experiment was that of varying choice set sizes. Brazilian electoral institutions ensure that there are many candidates for most elected offices. There are usually at least five, even for most single-member district elections. Brazil's multiparty system, OLPR (open list proportional representation) rules, and large districts mean that legislative elections may force voters to choose between as many as one thousand candidates. Our results indicate that an increase from three to only twelve candidates significantly changed patterns of voting behavior, increasing most voters' reliance on simple racial cues that triggered their racial identities instead of voting based on candidates' policy positions.

Finally, returning to our opening question about the disproportionately low number of nonwhite representatives, although we have found evidence of racial identity voting, it should not prevent the election of nonwhite representatives. More than 50 percent of Brazilians identify as nonwhite as of the last census, and in the high-magnitude, low-information environments of Brazilian legislative elections, nonwhite candidacies should resonate and generate support among same-race constituencies. However, in the recent Congresses only a small percentage of federal deputies self-identified as black. In 2006, 25 of 513 deputies did so (less than 5 percent), while in 2010 this number increased to 43 (8.4 percent) (Braga and Nascimento 2011).<sup>21</sup> This suggests that any barriers to nonwhite candidates' electoral success are not based in voter bias against such candidates. Instead, barriers must exist elsewhere—in the distribution of campaign resources, patterns of candidate recruitment, or even more fundamentally in educational and professional opportunities that are prerequisites for strong campaigns. Future work could ex-

21. We know of no similar data for the very large pool of candidates running for legislative office.

plore the supply and quality of nonwhite candidates to reconcile the apparent demand for nonwhite representatives and the dearth of successful candidacies.

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